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46 
Response 
In Defense of Future Children: A 
Response to Cohen’s Beyond Best Interests 
Kimberly M. Mutcherson† 
Reproduction is a private affair and parenthood is its intense reward. 
The reproductive drive needs to be tempered by the collective virtue 
of human solidarity so the aspirations and rewards of having fine 
children can be shared by everyone.1 
 
  INTRODUCTION   
I. Glenn Cohen’s articles, Regulating Reproduction: The 
Problem with Best Interests2 and Beyond Best Interests,3 are 
well-argued pieces of legal scholarship written with the ambi-
tious goal of “fundamentally re-writ[ing] the way we talk and 
think about regulating reproduction.”4 It is a goal that Cohen 
has pursued in a range of different pieces concerned with the 
problems of reproduction in our complicated post-coital world. 
In Beyond Best Interests, and its companion piece, he points to 
the multiple examples of the use of an appeal to the best inter-
ests of the resulting child, or BIRC as he calls it, as a sufficient 
basis for a range of intrusive interferences with and denials of 
reproductive choice.5 He makes his case using examples rang-
ing from criminal bans on brother-sister incest to similar bans 
on the sale of sperm purchased from an anonymous source to 
 
†  For Max and Beanie, whom I loved before they were born. Copyright © 
2012 by Kimberly M. Mutcherson. 
 1. ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNING BABIES 241 (1999). 
 2. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best In-
terests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011) [hereinafter Regulating Reproduction]. 
 3. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187 (2012) 
[hereinafter Beyond Best Interests]. 
 4. Id. at 1274. 
 5. While much of the commentary in this response addresses the text in 
Beyond Best Interests, the points made here are generally applicable to Regu-
lating Reproduction as well. 
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make a baby.6 He rejects BIRC as unsound largely because it 
falls prey to Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem, which as Co-
hen succinctly describes it, holds that “we cannot be said to 
harm children by creating them as long as we do not give them 
a life not worth living.”7 Further, when we the law to intervene 
in reproduction we also alter who gets made. In other words, 
when we keep a woman from becoming pregnant at point A, 
which would have resulted in the birth of child B, the child who 
she bears at some later point will be child C. Therefore, it is 
impossible in most cases for us to say that we have regulated 
reproductive choice to change the future of one child except to 
the extent that we have prevented that child from ever being 
born.  
Not only does Cohen reject BIRC because of its non-
identity implications, he further rejects a range of ways that 
people might attempt to avoid the implications of BIRC. Reject-
ed reformulations include those focusing on imperfect non-
identity problems meaning problems that will not necessarily 
impact a whole population of future people who will never come 
to be but some smaller slice of that population,8 or by focusing 
on non-person affecting principles, which shift our analysis 
from an individual child to broader conceptions of creating 
more or less good in the world by reducing or replacing the 
number of people who will experience more suffering or limited 
opportunities.9 He then turns to dismantling other justificatory 
regimes for reproductive regulation including concerns about 
reproductive externalities, 3rd parties who will be harmed by 
the births of particular children, and an argument based on the 
idea that an act can be wrongful where there is harm even if 
there is an overall benefit, such as a life worth living.10 He ends 
by problematizing regulatory rationales based on legal moralist 
concerns steeped in the idea that it is good to deter acts that 
“undermine public morality” or virtue ethics concerns for the 
 
 6. As Cohen notes in Regulating Reproduction, the general convention is 
to refer to men who sell their sperm in a booming commercial market as do-
nors. See Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2. Bowing to this convention 
perpetuates myths of altruism that ultimately mask commodification and 
therefore make it more difficult for us to seriously consider the realities of a 
market in making babies. Such a market clearly warrants serious and ongoing 
consideration, therefore this response will dispense with using the word donor. 
 7. Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2, at 437. 
 8. Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2, at 457. 
 9. Id. at 481–482. 
 10. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1244. 
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virtue of the parents or future parents who are making procre-
ative of decisions.11 Here he points out that these rationales 
may be masked by BIRC and that it is a good thing to get them 
out into the open.12 He also argues that the virtue ethics ap-
proach may fall prey to the non-identity problem, therefore 
making it illegitimate.13  
The ultimate implication of Cohen’s work is that if the 
BIRC rationale is bankrupt and actually masks a string of 
problematic rationales for denying access to reproductive 
choice, then the larger scholarly and policymaking conversation 
about the regulation of reproduction needs to experience pro-
found changes. He gives some concession to the idea that re-
productive externality issues might warrant reproductive regu-
lation, but only in a small number of cases.14 Further, he 
asserts that if forced to argue based on true motivations, in-
cluding in some cases a preference for heterosexist notions of 
family life, those making such strong arguments for reproduc-
tive regulation might find themselves waging a much more up-
hill battle.15  
Cohen’s work fits into a long and ongoing collection of 
scholarly work about “whether, when, and with whom individ-
uals reproduce.”16 These scholars of reproduction include many 
people who share some of the scholarly commitments that ap-
pear to flow through Cohen’s work including grave concerns 
about state attempts to regulate reproduction and the bioethi-
cal and legal scholarship that champions such a move.17 These 
scholars have written extensively about ways in which the best 
interests of the child rationale can and often has been used as 
subterfuge for pernicious types of bias18 and, their writing on 
 
 11. Id. at 1265. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1269. 
 14. Id. at 1243. 
 15. Id. at 1266. 
 16. Id. at 1192. 
 17. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the 
Reproductive Lives of Poor Black and Racially Subjugated Women, 18 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 609 (2009); Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother: 
Why America's Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the An-
swer—A Comparative Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389 (2009). 
 18. Though Cohen’s narrative does not focus on the best interest of the 
existing child, it is worth noting that many scholars and activists have chal-
lenged the use of the best interest paradigm in the context of live children, as 
juxtaposed against Cohen’s resulting children, because the test is subjective on 
a level that can make it feel almost meaningless. See, e.g., Andrea Charlow, 
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the myriad ways in which reproduction is a unique site for con-
sidering notions of human rights, dignity, and autonomy is il-
lustrative of the core issues that are relevant when one writes 
about the practice and regulation of having babies. When the 
state regulates access to reproduction, and it does so in a range 
of ways with disparate impacts on various populations, it strips 
individuals of agency; it denies privileges of citizenship; and it 
deprives people of dignity and human rights. When practiced 
on a large scale, state sponsored reproductive control can have 
profound impacts across a population. But even when practiced 
on a small scale, the individual consequences for a person left 
to ponder why the state is so appalled by the specter of her pro-
creating that it would legislate against it has the potential to 
be devastating. While not specifically articulated in this way in 
Cohen’s writing, it is vital to ground this discussion in the seri-
ousness of its ramifications and the often discriminatory ways 
in which the power to regulate reproduction is wielded. 
While there is much to appreciate in Cohen’s work, as a 
whole it fails to attain his goal of fundamentally shifting the 
terrain upon which discussions about exercising control over 
reproduction takes place. This response offers four interrelated 
observations about why Cohen’s work is ultimately unconvinc-
ing or less persuasive than it might otherwise be. First, his 
work is rooted in the notion of procreation as substantially, and 
perhaps strictly, a matter of rights and autonomy. That conver-
sation ignores the ways in which such a narrow lens continu-
ously fails to capture the complexities of the enterprise of creat-
ing new lives. An enterprise that necessarily involves some 
consideration of consequences for those who already exist and 
those who will exist. Second, Cohen’s work takes little account 
of the fact that actively choosing to have children is a moral 
choice and, as such, it is subject to condemnation, critique and 
public scrutiny. Third, and this is the most important critique 
and it is closely related to the first two, if we take Cohen at his 
 
Awarding Custody: The Best Interest of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE 
L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 272–273 (1987) (“Use of the indeterminate best interests 
standard permits individual judges to ignore the results of scientific research 
and to substitute their prejudices and values for those of legisla-
tures . . . . [T]he current best interests standard provides too much latitude in 
which judges can obscure the rationales for their decisions and allows them to 
base custody awards on their personal values.”). See also, David L. Chambers, 
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 477 (1984). 
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word that his piece is about shifting the conversation in the pol-
icy realm, his work substantially misses the proverbial boat. 
There is no way that broad conversations about reproductive 
regulation, and broad in this sense refers to conversations out-
side the confines of the insular world of academia, can or will 
be conducted without some notion of the consequences that the 
exercise of reproductive choice has on the lives of those children 
who issue as a result of such choices. Fourth, and finally, the 
real task of those of who find BIRC untenable is not to convince 
others that it is unsound—philosophically or otherwise—but to 
convince them that their notions of best interest are flawed. 
This task is no doubt daunting, but the probability of success 
on this account is substantially stronger than the probability of 
convincing a range of decision makers that their resort to the 
best interests of future children to rationalize action is and for-
ever will be completely inadequate.19 
I.  JUSTICE AND RIGHTS OR JUSTICE, NOT RIGHTS   
Crucial to this critique of Cohen is a broader framing of the 
problem that he seeks to solve. In Cohen’s work, it is never 
quite clear who exactly he is fighting for or why. To be sure, he 
gives several specific examples of people who are subject to 
regulation of their procreative choices, siblings in love among 
them, but he never quite lays out why all of this matters in a 
practical sense, though the answer to that is likely quite obvi-
ous to most readers. The primacy of the discussion about how 
to regulate procreative choices, if at all, rests on very specific 
ideas about procreation that merit ongoing exploration as they 
are contested in academia and beyond. Cohen’s vision of why 
this conversation matters appears to rest on his “modestly lib-
ertarian view” that “the State has to offer some justification for 
limiting individuals’ reproductive choices . . . .”20 Specifically, 
Cohen’s articles seem to take as unchallenged the premise that 
the appropriate regime for worrying about issues of reproduc-
tive regulation is one that is rooted in the stand-alone notion of 
reproduction as a right. Undergirding all of Cohen’s discussion 
in Beyond Best Interests is an understanding of procreation as a 
 
 19. Throughout this response, I focus in particular on Cohen’s discussions 
related to assisted reproductive technology (ART), as this is the area in which 
I have been primarily focused for some years. I also believe that the ART are-
na sets up some interesting conflicts related to how reproduction may be per-
ceived differently depending upon its context.  
 20. Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2, at 429. 
 2012] IN DEFENSE OF FUTURE CHILDREN 51 
 
fundamental right as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma.21 While it is uncertain whether that fun-
damental right extends to the use of ART, and this question is 
disputed in the literature, there are certainly those who vigor-
ously make this argument.22 Similarly, within the realm of eth-
ics, there are those for whom procreation is a right, not a privi-
lege, that is worthy of respect and protection, but that is also 
subject to limits.23 The organizing framework of rights, howev-
er, is not uncontested territory. As a general matter, the debate 
about rights as an organizing framework is not necessary to re-
peat here as it has been raging for far too long to be dismissed 
as inconsequential.24 The field of advocacy related to reproduc-
tion has not been immune to this debate and its consequence is 
that many of those who formerly considered themselves advo-
cates for reproductive rights now proudly proclaim that they 
are advocates for reproductive justice.25  
The shift from rights to justice is an important one as no-
tions of justice, especially as articulated by the reproductive 
justice (“RJ”) movement, have long taken careful note of differ-
ence and offered multi-layered critiques of the relationship be-
tween reproduction and oppression in our divided and unequal 
world. Cohen’s work takes no real account of the concept of re-
 
 21. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1188 (citing Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). 
 22. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Reproductive Rights and Reproductive 
Technology in 2030, THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 1–18 (Jeffrey Rosen 
& Benjamin Wittes eds.). 
 23. Laura Purdy explains, “Although there is no explicit constitutional 
right to procreate, it is generally assumed that such a right is implied by other 
fundamental constitutional rights. It is also assumed that it is, in any case, 
morally justifiable to assert such a right, and that this right should be protect-
ed by law.” Laura M. Purdy, Loving Future People, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, 
AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, 301 (Joan C. Callahan ed.) (1995). See 
also, Bonnie Steinbock, Reproductive Rights and Responsibilities, 24 HAST-
ING’S CENTER REPORT 15 (2004) (discussing the contours of a right to procrea-
tive liberty and concluding that those without capacity to parent do not have a 
right to reproduce). 
 24. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 
(1993) (describing the critical legal studies critique of the rights framework). 
 25. See, e.g., Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-
Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L. J. 1394 (2009); Zenaida 
Mendez, Reproductive Justice Is Every Woman's Right, NATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION FOR WOMEN, http://www.now.org/nnt/fall-2006/reproductive_justice.html 
(describing the National Organization for Women’s adoption of a resolution 
“calling for a collaborative reproductive justice campaign that would ‘connect 
the relevance of reproductive rights, health care and justice to the race and 
ethnicity of all women, including women with disabilities.’”). 
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productive oppression as an active and vital part of any conver-
sation about the regulation of reproduction. To ignore both the 
discriminatory nature of much of reproductive regulation, in 
that it hits most deeply at traditionally disenfranchised groups, 
and to not discuss the consequences that flow from treating ac-
cess to reproduction in a cavalier or discriminatory fashion 
leaves a big hole in this analysis.  
To talk of justice rather than rights does not dismiss the 
relevance of rights in the context of reproduction. Rather, the 
reproductive justice narrative takes rights as necessary but not 
sufficient for the purpose of freeing women and others from the 
shackles of reproductive oppression.26 The goal of this move-
ment is to ensure that all people have “the economic, social, and 
political power and resources to make healthy decisions about 
[their]bodies, sexuality and reproduction for 
[them]selves . . . and [their] communities . . . .”27 Reproductive 
justice advocates and scholars have long pondered the danger-
ous, pernicious, and oftentimes discriminatory ways in which a 
professed concern for future children justifies a range of abuses 
against the poor, people of color, those with developmental dis-
abilities and other disenfranchised populations. Cohen makes 
brief reference to forced sterilization of those with disabilities 
and other types of reproductive wrongs,28 but reproductive jus-
tice scholars like Dorothy Roberts have long documented and 
decried the reality of reproduction as a site for intersectional 
oppression, especially for women of color, poor women, immi-
grants and others.29 They have also noted that in the case of 
 
 26. Reproductive oppression here refers to the multiplicity of ways in 
which the ability to reproduce has served as a site of public control over the 
lives of individuals, especially women. This oppression comes in the form of 
reduced access to the tools of avoiding pregnancy, as well as sterilization 
abuse, criminalization of actions taken while pregnant, reduction in access to 
abortion services, and discrimination in employment based on pregnancy or 
reproductive capacity.  
 27. A New Vision for Advancing our Movement for Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Justice, FORWARD TOGETHER, http:// 
forwardtogether.org/assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New-Vision.pdf .  
 28. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1192. 
 29. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRO-
DUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Betsy Hartmann, REPRODUC-
TIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL 
(1995); Sarah Smith Kuehnel, Abstinence-Only Education Fails African Amer-
ican Youth, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1241 (2009); Alexandria Walden, Abortion 
Rights for ICE Detainees: Evaluating Constitutional Challenges to Restrictions 
on the Right to Abortion for Women in ICE Detention, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 979 
(2009).  
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children of color and poor children, professed concern for the 
best interests of future children so often seems to end soon af-
ter those children leave their mother’s wombs.30 This last point, 
which starkly ties together the two strands of best interest of 
the child, has strong political resonance—-a resonance that 
would get lost if one simply jettisoned the best interests discus-
sion from all interactions related to reproduction. 
This information about reproductive justice is relevant for 
a few reasons. First, it highlights that the population for whom 
Cohen’s arguments are salient goes beyond brothers and sisters 
interested in pursuing sexual relationships with each other or 
post-menopausal women who desire to have children or even 
same-sex couples who want to create families with children. In 
fact, those individuals are probably a tiny fraction of the people 
for whom reproductive oppression is of primary concern. The 
collection of individuals, especially women, for whom a critical 
understanding of the role played by the BIRC trope in policy-
making and legal analysis is broad, diverse, and often times po-
litically weak.  
Second, a justice lens, in contrast to a rights lens, tells 
complicated stories about identity and imagines a diverse range 
of interests related to reproduction that are both individual and 
community oriented. For instance, the justice lens is firmly 
rooted in the concept of intersectionality, which takes as its 
starting point the understanding that overlapping identities 
have profound implications for how one moves through the 
world.31 A justice lens does the critical work of highlighting the 
reality that procreation has been and well into the future will 
continue to be a place where deep fears about race, gender, 
sexual orientation, and class privilege play themselves out on 
bodies that are largely female. As such, BIRC is not just about 
the who, what, and when of procreation. It is profoundly and 
disturbingly about staking out claims of worthiness, about who 
deserves to be a full and complete member of the polity, and the 
 
 30. According to the Children’s Defense Fund, each day in America: 2 
mothers die in childbirth; 5 children are killed by abuse or neglect; 5 children 
or teens commit suicide; 8 children or teens are killed by firearms; 80 babies 
die before their first birthdays; 949 babies are born at low birthweight; 2,058 
children are confirmed as abused or neglected; 2,163 babies are born without 
health insurance; and 2,573 babies are born into poverty. Each Day in Ameri-
ca, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND (July 2011), http://www.childrensdefense.org/ 
child-research-data-publications/each-day-in-america.html. 
 31. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
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meanings of citizenship and human dignity. What is at stake 
when one contemplates the role of BIRC in discussing repro-
duction is very much the stuff of life. Even more though, the 
community element of the justice narrative suggests that dis-
cussions about procreation are not simply about a contest of 
clashing rights and radical autonomy involving atomistic indi-
viduals, but also involve questions of interdependence, obliga-
tion, and relationship.32 For those who believe that these ideas 
of connection and obligation are central to talk about reproduc-
tion, even if the conclusions that we draw from this insight are 
different than those drawn by others, there is an obligation to 
talk frankly about how and why those potential connections or 
possible obligations do not dictate a single answer to how peo-
ple should or should not pursue procreation.  
II.  HAVING CHILDREN IS A MORAL CHOICE   
Also largely missing from Cohen’s work is clear acknowl-
edgement that having children is a choice fairly subject to an 
ethical analysis that has policymaking implications. This seems 
like an especially relevant point in an article that substantially 
concerns itself with philosophy and ethics so that if it is a phil-
osophical argument that lays the foundation for rejecting a par-
ticular regulatory regime, other philosophical arguments may 
be relevant to the discussion as well. As described above, Cohen 
ascribes to himself a modestly libertarian view about human 
reproduction. It is not incompatible with such a view to have 
deep respect for private choices related to reproduction, while 
being cognizant of the fact that procreation is in the public in-
terest and there are public interests in procreation such that 
the choice to procreate can raise serious public concerns that 
justify the existence of public discussion though not necessarily 
public control. This means that any veil of privacy surrounding 
procreative choice can be pierced. Individuals and those who 
govern them have obligations to generations that follow and 
opting to create life is not an ethically neutral transaction. As 
the philosopher Laura Purdy contends, the fact that one has 
serious misgiving about and finds unjustifiable most limits on 
individual reproductive behavior does not mean that “there are 
 
 32. The concept of relational autonomy does some of the work of describ-
ing how one can subscribe to notions of autonomy that do not depend on the 
concept of disconnect. See, e.g., RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona MacKenzie & 
Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). 
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no moral limits on reproduction.”33 Put another way, “exercis-
ing your legal rights can sometimes be morally wrong.”34 No 
doubt, the space between public concern and public control is 
frequently bridged and describing ways of maintaining that 
space without denying the legitimacy of public concern is a con-
sistent theme in the scholarship of reproduction. 
While Cohen’s philosophical leanings lead him to the con-
clusion that the non-identity problem makes it impossible to 
justify reproductive regulation based on the interests of future 
children, one can legitimately conclude that reproduction with-
out serious thought toward future children is morally suspect. 
Again from Laura Purdy: “If we are consistent in our concern 
about human happiness, it seems clear that we must attend to 
the welfare of future people,”35 which, in Purdy’s case, means 
rejecting the implications of Parfit’s non-identity problem. In 
part she does so by casting some doubt on the idea of what it 
means for a different person to exist from each new meeting of 
sperm and egg.36 Further, she argues that the highly abstract 
examples offered by Parfit37 coupled with a narrow focus on 
harming individuals, “as opposed to states of 
harm[] . . . implicitly promotes an unattractive ethic of moral 
minimalism that could hardly be distinguished from libertari-
anism.”38 She concludes: 
The underlying moral principle here seems to be that it is morally 
permissible to bring you to life as long as you can be expected to find 
your life worth living, because you are not thereby harmed (even if 
you have been born in a harmed state) and it is permissible to do any-
thing that does not harm you. What we owe others is thus reduced to 
not harming them, and the standard for not having harmed them is 
set very low. Generalizing these principles to other cases would lead 
to a great deal of misery.39 
Purdy’s rejection of the implications of Parfit is important 
because it shows us one way out of the non-identity problem 
 
 33. Purdy, supra note 23, at 301. 
 34. Id. at 302. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 314. 
 37. Christine Overall also critiques Parfit’s and others’ chosen hypotheti-
cals, noting “examples of women who happily or at least indifferently contem-
plate giving birth to suffering children are scarcely believable.” CHRISTINE 
OVERALL, WHY HAVE CHILDREN?: THE ETHICAL DEBATE 151 (Arthur Kaplan 
ed., 2012). 
 38. Id. at 316. 
 39. Id. at 316–317. 
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and exposes the moral limits of non-identity as a baseline for 
considering procreative choice. 
In a similar vein, in her book, WHY HAVE CHILDREN?, 
Christine Overall ponders why it is that people are often called 
on to justify why they are childless, but are much less frequent-
ly asked why they have opted to have children.40 In part it 
might be because having children is considered part of fulfilling 
a biological destiny, an inadequate argument in Overall’s esti-
mation,41 but she argues that questions about having children 
are both prudential and ethical as: 
[T]hey are about whether to bring a person . . . into existence—-and 
that person cannot, by the very nature of the situation, give consent 
to being brought into existence. Such questions therefore profoundly 
affect the well-being both of existing persons (the potential parents, 
siblings, grandparent, and all the other people with whom the future 
child may interact) and potential persons.42 
She goes on to note that procreative decisions have pro-
found impacts on children, no doubt, and significant implica-
tions for communities. Overall also rejects Parfit’s framing of 
identity in a way that inexorably and conveniently leads to his 
non-identity problem. She believes that the relevant identity 
category is not that of the child produced by the joining of a 
particular egg and a particular sperm. Rather, citing to Sim 
Vehmas, Overall argues that the relevant data point is the 
identity of the child vis a vis that child’s “social place” in the 
family.43 In other words, what matters from the perspective of a 
parent is whether the child is the first child, second child, etc. 
and this identity category is not determined by what sperm and 
egg combination comes together at any point in time.44 If Over-
all is right, then the non-identity problem is not really a prob-
lem at all, but I suspect that Cohen does not believe that Over-
all is right. 
Cohen’s response to all of this is probably that Overall and 
Purdy are falling into the same philosophical fallacy that so 
many have entered before them, but after making that claim 
one needs to be prepared to offer some alternative account of 
 
 40. This freedom from being asked to justify one’s choice to parent tends 
to be reserved for those deemed to be good parents worthy of procreation. So it 
is the case that procreation pursued by single women, same-sex couples, low-
income people and other categories of reproductive outsiders is often met with 
derision instead of delight. OVERALL, supra note 34. 
 41. Id. at 3.  
 42. Id. at 6.  
 43. Id. at 152. 
 44. Id. at 153. 
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why procreation and procreative choice are matters worth ethi-
cal inquiry. It is not clear if Cohen would take the unequivocal 
position that the interests of future children are unknown, un-
knowable, and unworthy of reflection unless the life to be lived 
would not be worth living. If he did, such a position dismisses a 
critical conversation that goes to the heart of the procreative 
discussion. One need not be pro-life in the political sense in or-
der to believe that matters of life merit both public and private 
care and concern. Assuming that Cohen believes that this is 
true, how he would articulate and justify such care and concern 
without reference to future children or to reproductive exter-
nalities that offer no account of anything substantive being 
owed to future people, but that focus instead on the interests of 
the already living? In other words, if we jettison BIRC, as Co-
hen suggests, what remains to anchor any public concerns 
about procreation other than the slim tether of reproductive ex-
ternalities? More important, what remains to obligate the state 
in positive ways to provide services to those who procreate?  
III.  BIRC IS HERE TO STAY   
Despite Cohen’s quest to ensure that “never again will pol-
icymakers, courts, and legislatures defend the regulation of re-
production on grounds of children’s best interest or child wel-
fare,”45 it is certain that BIRC will remain a cornerstone of 
policymaking regarding reproduction for decades to come. If 
Cohen’s goal was simply to engage in debate with other schol-
ars, he can claim to have successfully continued the quest to 
chip away at or at least expose the difficulties inherent in pre-
suming to consider the interests of a person not yet conceived. 
However, as Purdy and others have indicated, Parfit’s non-
identity problem is not without its holes that make it a less 
than optimum theory of the morality of procreation.46 Even Co-
hen’s claim that courts have already taken up some elements of 
non-identity through jurisprudence on wrongful life claims, in 
which a child with a disability claims his existence as an injury 
worth compensation because of a negligent failure to give his 
parents information that would have led them to abort him, 
 
 45. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1274. 
 46. See, e.g., James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804 
(1986); Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A 
Kantian Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101 (1989); Jeffrey Reiman, 
Being Fair to Future People: The Non-Identity Problem in the Original Posi-
tion, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 69 (2007). 
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has some holes.47 After all, wrongful life claims seem to go 
hand-in-hand with wrongful birth claims so that a court has 
the easy exit of allowing parents to recover for the negligent 
denial of making a choice to abort without explicitly ruling on 
whether the child’s life is worth living.48 But where there is no 
companion wrongful birth claim, at least one court has deter-
mined that a wrongful life claim could stand, thus suggesting 
that the calculus being done by these courts is a bit more com-
plex than Cohen admits.49 This further intimates that the story 
about wrongful life claims and non-identity that Cohen offers is 
more complicated and will resonate in the BIRC debate far into 
the future. 
This persistence of the debate about BIRC in the literature 
(after all, Parfit threw down the gauntlet of non-identity in 
1984) speaks to the larger point here, which is about the rhe-
torical staying power of BIRC and Cohen’s ambition, which 
goes beyond the community of scholars. Whatever their 
strengths, these articles will not put a nail in the coffin of the 
use of BIRC. This has nothing to do with the power of the ar-
gument. Instead, it is because Cohen does not successfully cap-
ture the extent to which BIRC is an expression of a larger and 
intuitively persuasive view of the basic requirements of human 
goodness and a prerequisite to many accounts of human flour-
ishing and human obligation. This goes to the points that Co-
hen makes at the end of Beyond Best Interests in which he dis-
counts the contribution of virtue ethics to the discussion of the 
 
 47. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1213. 
 48. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (1986) (rejecting wrongful life 
claim but embracing wrongful birth claim). 
 49. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (1984). Furthermore, when courts em-
brace wrongful birth while rejecting wrongful life, they convince themselves 
that in so doing they have avoided embracing the idea of a life not worth liv-
ing. In fact, though, those wrongful birth claims, while given a different con-
ceptual cloak, rest on the premise that potential parents would have deemed 
their now living disabled child to have a future not worth living and would 
have terminated that fetus in utero had they been presented with accurate 
and timely information. In some very real sense, vindicating the right of the 
parent to make reproductive decisions with full information premised on cir-
cumstances that lead to the birth of a child with disabilities whose presence is 
a harm to her parents who would have avoided her birth is tantamount to say-
ing that the child’s life was one not worth pursuing and not worth living. This 
in substance is the crux of a wrongful life claim. Plus, one wonders whether 
there is much difference between being told that one’s life is not worth living 
versus being told that one is not worth parenting. All of this is to say that the 
message that courts send when they embrace wrongful birth and sanctimoni-
ously reject wrongful life is fuzzy. 
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regulation of reproduction. Virtue ethics refers to branch of eth-
ical thought that concerns itself with the virtue or moral char-
acter of an actor rather than the consequences of an act or the 
duties or rules that inspire a particular action. Within Cohen’s 
account, virtue ethics has the benefit that it can, if wielded cor-
rectly, circumvent the non-identity problem because it does not 
rely on any reference to the well-being of a future child, but on-
ly the moral character of the parent or potential parent.50 In 
other instances, though, where a reference to the moral virtue 
of a parent measures that virtue in part by reference to the 
flourishing of a future child, non-identity once again rears its 
head.51  
But, Cohen may be too quick to reject the insights of virtue 
ethics or the extent to which this branch of inquiry closely 
tracks the root of much policymaking. Title notwithstanding, 
BIRC is not solely about a child and it certainly need not be re-
duced to any given child and any given set of parental decision 
makers. Instead, it is a stand in for a larger conversation about 
the nature of reproductive responsibility, a concept certainly as 
slippery and malleable as the concept of the best interests of a 
(real or imagined) child. The logical fallacy of BIRC is not whol-
ly relevant to the bigger conversation which BIRC raises which 
is under what conditions is it responsible for a person to pro-
create? No doubt there are many who would say that there is 
no objective answer to this question, and Cohen notes that part 
of the problem of virtue ethics is that people will and do pro-
pose dueling ideas about what is means to act virtuously as a 
future parent. Within the policy arena smart people consistent-
ly engage in this inquiry and make policies based on the con-
clusions that they draw. For some policymakers, it is not re-
sponsible to have a child while one is receiving public 
assistance and the right policy move is to cap benefits for fami-
lies receiving such assistance so that the aid flowing to the fam-
ily will not increase if a child is born while that family is receiv-
ing government aid.52 The interests of children, present and 
future, is central to the debate surrounding such caps as is a 
baseline concern about how policy can and should be used to 
 
 50. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1270. 
 51. Id. at 1271. 
 52. See, e.g., Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Co-
ercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.F GENDER & L. 151, 
152 (2006) (noting that as of her writing, 22 states had family cap or child ex-
clusion policies in place).  
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trigger certain types of decisions by would-be parents on behalf 
of would-be children.53 While people draw differing conclusions 
about those interests, the idea that those interests are irrele-
vant to the conversation is not even entertained. Similar policy 
examples abound, but they all boil down to the idea that a criti-
cal and foundational component of actively engaging in a deci-
sion to procreate is an assessment of the life that is being of-
fered to a future person, as an individual, and to future people 
in aggregate.  
Reproductive responsibility and BIRC as some faction of 
evaluating that responsibility is ubiquitous and it speaks to the 
fact that BIRC is not strictly about logic or reason, but it reso-
nates instinctively with people precisely because it takes seri-
ously, as a normative matter, the idea that one can act wrongly 
by procreating. Concomitant with this belief for many people is 
one that holds that the state has obligations to provide services 
to better the conditions in which procreation happens. By this I 
mean that people believe in the idea of BIRC because it fits 
with an account that future people are owed some measure of 
respect and that one who seeks to bring new life into the world 
has obligations to that new life that begin at least at pregnancy 
if not well before. It is because of BIRC that women begin to 
take pre-natal vitamins while trying to become pregnant. It is 
BIRC that drives families to move to bigger homes in good 
school districts in anticipation of having a child. BIRC drives 
future fathers to begin smoking cessation programs so that 
they can become non-smokers before their future child is con-
ceived. BIRC is the incentive for a woman living with diabetes 
to get her disease under control before she attempts to become 
pregnant. 
The list of ways in which individuals and couples organize 
their lives around the potential for potential life is staggering, 
if not surprising. Similarly, as Cohen notes, there is law and 
public policy aimed at future generations in explicit and implic-
it ways. Much of our governmental policy related to protecting 
the environment hinges on a belief that we have obligations to 
be good stewards of the earth for those who will inherit it long 
after those of us alive today have shuffled off this mortal coil. 
Cohen might argue that these efforts are for the benefit of 
many and not one specific future person. Plus, our actions in 
protecting the environment have real, tangible benefit for those 
 
 53. Id. 
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alive today. But the point here is that choosing to create life is 
an act with consequences. Some of those consequences are the 
reproductive externalities that Cohen describes in his piece, 
with a focus on so-called “cost-type externalities to third-parties 
within a State,”54 but the most basic consequence of engaging 
in a procreative act is that, when successful, such an act ends 
in the arrival of a new human being. It is precisely because of 
this simultaneously simple and complicated truth that BIRC is 
here to stay. It is an intuitive, powerful and intractable politi-
cal tool and one cannot jettison that tool without providing an 
adequate account of what will replace it. Cohen offers no such 
account here and no clear way forward to creating such an ac-
count. 
Many people, policymakers among them, find it abhorrent 
to argue that whatever acts one commits during the process of 
creating new life are not wholly morally repugnant so long as 
the life being brought into being is not without worth. It may be 
that I am taking Cohen’s argument in a direction which he does 
not intend, but it is not an illogical direction. In fact, from the 
perspective of many laypeople, one comes to owe something to a 
child to a significant degree well before a child or even a preg-
nancy comes to pass. This reality is substantially missing from 
Cohen’s work and makes it seriously unlikely that it will reso-
nate strongly in the policymaking arena. This lack of resonance 
might be irrelevant, but based on Cohen’s stated goals, I think 
it is not. Cohen argues that BIRC is a “non-starter,” “empty,” 
and “misleading” and that it is used to “avoid [] confrontation 
with justificatory idioms that are disturbing, controversial, and 
illiberal,”55 but none of these things are necessarily true in an 
objective sense. The BIRC idiom is in fact the most basic of 
starting points for conversations about reproduction. Cohen’s 
point is that it should not be, but that is a normative claim 
whereas the claim in this response is descriptive. BIRC can 
have serious content even if the content that it reveals is un-
derneath its surface rather than on its face. That subsurface 
content is not misleading to the extent that what it concerns it-
self with is seeking to get people and policymakers to take as 
seriously the decisions that precede procreation as those that 
follow. The idioms that justify these moves may be disturbing, 
controversial and illiberal, but in many cases those disturbing, 
controversial and illiberal arguments are being made in con-
 
 54. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1218. 
 55. Id. at 1189. 
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junction with BIRC so it is inaccurate to say that BIRC is al-
ways a mask for something dark.56  
As Cohen notes in his own piece, this belief in BIRC has 
consequences in the law and policy arena. The power of the 
state is brought to bear on women who pursue pregnancy in 
spite of active use of illegal drugs.57 People seek to appoint a 
guardian for a fetus when its mother is developmentally disa-
bled and incapable of making her own decisions related to re-
production.58 The irony in the ART context is that the non-
identity problem protects the reproductive freedom of people 
who may be more inclined than anyone to consider themselves 
parents with parental obligations before a pregnancy is even 
begun. Imagine the married couple, same-sex or opposite sex, 
that begins discussing decorations for a nursery before even 
hiring the surrogate that they will need to carry their future 
child in her womb. In the end, many people, perhaps most, con-
sider it anathema not to consider a child’s welfare in the pro-
cess of preparing for that child’s conception and birth. Imagine 
Cohen or Parfit in a room of “donor-conceived”59 children who 
want answers about their genetic origins. Those young people 
or adults would not be satisfied with a claim that reducing ac-
cess to anonymity in the sale of sperm would have led to their 
non-existence. By the same token, as people and policymakers 
consider what changes technology has wrought on traditional 
notions of family, there is a desire to cling to the preciousness 
of genetic tie as a last bastion of normalcy. In that case, the 
idea of severing that connection by allowing people to move 
through the world without knowledge of their genetic origins 
will strikes many as a denial of a basic human right and a 
wholly preventable harm inflicted on future people. 
 
 56. For instance, Savulescu makes his disturbing argument about a duty 
to enhance without subterfuge. Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why 
We Should Select the Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413 (2001). 
 57. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (describing and 
finding unconstitutional a program at Medical University of South Carolina 
that involved arresting women who gave birth while using illegal drugs). 
 58. Wixtrom v. Department of Children and Family Services (In re 
J.D.S.), 864 So.2d 534 (2004) (court refused to appoint a guardian for the fetus 
of a severely developmentally disabled woman). 
 
 59. Many of those who are the product of alternative insemination involv-
ing purchased sperm, some of whom also actively work against the practice of 
anonymous sales of sperm within the fertility industry, use the term donor-
conceived to describe their provenance. See, e.g., http://donorconceived 
.blogspot.com/.  
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None of the preceding paragraphs should be read to reject 
Cohen’s important contribution to the scholarly conversation 
about the regulation of reproduction. In fact, in the ART con-
text, academics would do quite well to heed his call to find oth-
er ways to describe and support efforts to push policymakers 
toward more restrictive regulation of access to the tools of 
babymaking because anything that makes people substantially 
more conscious of the serious consequences of their advocacy in 
this arena is a good thing. Many of those writing in this arena, 
several of whom are cited in Cohen’s work, would argue that 
there is no hidden agenda in their work that uses the idea of 
best interests of the future child. For those authors, Cohen’s 
work is a clear challenge and seeing how they respond to his 
claims will be fruitful for this ongoing conversation. 
It may be the case that none of the foregoing discussion 
changes anything about what Cohen has written depending 
upon how narrow his claim is. His claim might simply be that 
policy and law cannot and should not be based on BIRC, or 
even more narrowly, that criminal prohibitions should not be 
premised on BIRC. More broadly, his claim could be that no de-
cision-making can or should be based on the best interests of a 
being not yet in existence. If his claim is the latter one, then it 
is far too broad. By contrast, if it is the former then we are left 
to ponder the justification for not extending the same claim to 
individual decision-making. If it is wrong for the state or other 
public bodies to act in the interest of that which does not yet ex-
ist because in so acting they change who will exist, that out-
come would seem to be the same for an individual as well. 
Once we extend the claim to individual decision making 
things get really scary. While few people would endorse arrest-
ing pregnant women who smoke cigarettes, most people would 
likely offer approval for public health officials advising preg-
nant women not to smoke. Further, most people would advise 
close friends and family members not to smoke while pregnant. 
A fair number of people would probably offer unsolicited advice 
to a pregnant stranger encountered on the street about her 
smoking habit. That advice would not be simply about repro-
ductive externalities such as premature births or low birth 
weight associated with children born to cigarette smokers. In-
stead, in advising a friend to kick her cigarette habit while 
pregnant, one would do so in part to urge that friend to act in a 
way that reflects some concern about the life in being that she 
is choosing to carry to term.  
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One might take the position that BIRC is always wrong or 
should be abandoned, but one might also take the position that 
wrong or not, BIRC is here to stay and that the fight, therefore, 
is not about eliminating BIRC, but molding it so as to limit its 
potential for harm. The challenge to Cohen, therefore, is to ask 
him to consider whether in fact the proper route to change poli-
cy is to get people to abandon notions of BIRC or to reconfigure 
their sense of what is in the best interest of a child not yet con-
ceived or not yet born. This is a proposal about practicality and 
feasibility rather than a proposal about supportable or insup-
portable philosophical claims because, again, even if his claims 
are well-supported, though not universally embraced in the 
scholarly literature,60 a good philosophical argument does not 
always (or often) hold great sway in the legislature.  
As any good politician would tell us, you do not win politi-
cal battles by ceding all of the good rhetoric to the other side 
and Cohen’s arguments allow for a wealth of rhetorical conces-
sions. In a fight on the floor of a state legislature, on Cohen’s 
side are those who do not care about the lives of future babies 
and children. On the other side are those who do. On Cohen’s 
side are those who would defend the rights of adults to have 
babies over the rights of those babies to be cared for and cared 
about prior to their birth and perhaps prior to conception. On 
the other side are those who declare that procreation is a right 
that brings with it enormous responsibilities that can and 
should be enforced by the government. When the rhetorical 
battle becomes between those who care about defenseless chil-
dren and those who do not, it is hard to feel that one is on the 
side of the angels if one does not side with the children. It is not 
clear from Cohen’s paper how he would extricate himself from 
this dilemma. None of this is meant to suggest that anyone who 
believes in the non-identity problem must necessarily believe 
that reproduction carries with it no responsibilities. But, to 
that extent that they do stake a claim for reproductive respon-
sibility they are obliged to offer a supportable basis for such a 
claim that makes no reference to the actual people created from 
reproductive acts.  
IV.  MAKING BIRC WORK   
It may indeed be the case that BIRC is as bankrupt as Co-
hen argues, but it can simultaneously be the case that attempt-
 
 60. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 23. 
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ing to break its hold is a quest that is doomed to failure or one 
that at least will take inordinate amounts of time to successful-
ly pursue. In the meantime, as Cohen points out in his piece, 
there are multiple scholars supporting an agenda of enhanced 
regulation in the ART arena that could have potential negative 
impacts on those who use ART to build families with children. 
Rather than put forth a freestanding proposal about how to re-
spond to these calls for regulatory action premised on BIRC, 
this response simply make a few points about a possible way 
forward. 
A way of reconfiguring BIRC comes from the realm of exist-
ing pregnancy regulation. Consider a pregnant woman or a 
woman eager to conceive who has some dangerous habits. Most 
individuals would agree that a fetus is very poorly- served by a 
pregnant woman or a soon to be pregnant woman who is an al-
coholic who consistently drinks alcohol to excess or who has an 
expensive heroin habit or who pops prescription pills like candy 
while pregnant. Such women draw substantial ire from the 
masses. Even women who have no illegal habits may find 
themselves judged for their wish to procreate if they are living 
with a profound disability or are living with a transmissible 
disease like HIV or if they are simply low-income. For these 
women, an extreme response to the idea of acting within the 
best interest of a child could be to sterilize women without their 
consent if there are serious concerns about their future parent-
ing skills; or arrest pregnant drug-using women; or deny access 
to fertility treatments for women living with disabilities. But, 
one could also turn the conversation away from punitive 
measures and instead imagine the ways in which the world 
could be re-configured to provide better services so as to avoid 
the need to punish. More treatment beds and less prison spaces 
for people with substance abuse problems. Broad access to sup-
portive services at a reasonable cost for people living with disa-
bilities. Higher minimum wage, greater job training, better 
public education. It is here that one has more than ample op-
portunity to expose the type of hypocrisy that Cohen fears lurks 
in so many discussions about BIRC. There is always much hue 
and cry about reproductive irresponsibility and such enormous 
reluctance to take steps that create much more supportive cir-
cumstances in which people can make choices for themselves 
and their families. In the act of highlighting that hypocrisy, we 
might do more for changing the perception of what is appropri-
ate regulation of procreative choice than we would by urging 
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people to ignore or unlearn everything they have come to value 
about what it means to procreate responsibly. Further, while 
Cohen is most concerned with criminal sanctions, the implica-
tions of his position might include arguments against positive 
attempts to influence reproductive decisions and create better 
conditions in which people opt to procreate. To the extent that 
his work would lead to conclusion in this vein that would be an 
unfortunate and, I imagine, unintended consequence of his 
work. 
  CONCLUSION   
The push back articulated in this response has the poten-
tial to reinforce uses of state power that many, myself included, 
find abhorrent. The goal here is not to buttress any foundation 
for discriminatory and dignity reducing public intrusions into 
private acts of procreation. But, to reject BIRC in a way that 
has resonance, requires two things. First, it requires acknowl-
edging the laudable goal that many individuals are pursuing 
when they make reference to BIRC—-namely asking those who 
have children to be ever mindful that procreation has power 
and therefore brings with it serious responsibility. In conjunc-
tion with this sense of private responsibility, BIRC asks the 
state to act in positive ways to create conditions under which 
children and families can both survive and thrive. Both of these 
goals can be used to justify extreme and discriminatory legisla-
tion, but they can also be used to justify goods like better en-
forcement of environmental standards, increased access to job 
training, and more availability of contraceptives. Any or all of 
these policy moves accrue to the benefit of existing and future 
people. Second, it requires offering some alternative formula-
tion to BIRC that allows policymakers to continue to consider 
that which makes the procreative act unique and what makes 
ART unique is that it is the only thing that we do that creates 
new human beings. And while it may seem quaint in an era of 
16 and Pregnant to imagine that there is something special 
about making a baby—-a world in which we no longer believe 
that procreation matters, to those who procreate and those who 
are made, is truly bankrupt. 
 
